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Preface
The Proliferation Security Initiative is an uncommon animal in the world of US policy -highly praised by conservatives as the greatest achievement of the State Department during the Bush administration and commended by liberals as a necessary instrument in our attempt to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Within the US military establishment, PSI has been viewed as the Navy's domain, nothing more than maritime interdiction with the added impetus of a presidential initiative behind it.
Both of these basic 'facts' contributed significantly in my decision to delve deeper into the Proliferation Security Initiative. As a foreign policy advisor (POLAD) at Air Combat Command, I read with great interest the State Department cable announcing PSI and outlining its basic structure and objectives. Upon first read, I was impressed with PSI in that it appeared to be a major multilateral initiative by the US right after Operation Iraqi Freedom that could go a long way towards mending the growing rift between the US and Europe. On a lower level, as an Air Force officer, I thought that if PSI were fully realized, it could significantly impact US Air Force operations world wide.
PSI has seen phenomenal growth in it's two years of existence as it has focused on the almost universally acknowledged problem of WMD. Starting with a small group of nations with the requisite capabilities, PSI has built momentum to the point where over 60 nations support PSI and participate in multinational exercises aimed at interdicting WMD-related shipments. However, some senior DoD officials think PSI will atrophy v unless it moves to the next phase as envisioned originally -the interdiction of WMDrelated shipments in the air.
In the following pages -explaining PSI's rationale, history, organization, and way forward -I hope to accomplish two things primarily. First is to provide a rather detailed explanation of PSI to the uninitiated, and second, to hopefully provide a starting point for Air Force planners who must make the air interdiction aspects of the Proliferation Security Initiative a reality. The next section will address PSI activities to date, how the initiative is organized, and a couple of key issues governing its operation. Third is a look at PSI's only public real-world success and its continued applicability in a new world "order" characterized by both the proliferation of terrorism and WMD. Finally, PSI will be examined with an eye toward the future -first as to the expansion of PSI itself into the air domain and PSI's part in the larger strategy of countering WMD proliferation.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has been called the greatest achievement of the State Department during Colin Powell's tenure 2 . In her first town hall meeting at State Department, Condoleeza Rice singled out PSI as an outstanding example of transformational diplomacy-crossing disciplines, regional lines and expertise to solve problems. Secretary Rice also described it as an organization without an address or a building, but which is working to interdict suspicious cargoes that may be WMD-related based on current national and international laws. 3 While PSI has been in existence for little more than two years, it has already achieved a significant success in the interdiction of the cargo ship, BBC China. An event which played a large part in the decision by
Libya to end its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. 4 
Mix & Match Multilateralism
It is easier to say what the Proliferation Security Initiative is not. The Wall Street
Journal cautions its readers to not "mistake PSI for a multilateral institution in the conventional sense…no headquarters, no secretary-general, no talkfests-and, perhaps most important of all, no French or Russian veto." 5 In positive terms, PSI is described as a "better way than traditional arms control to enforce global norms in the age of proliferating WMD through its "mix-and-match multilateralism" in which dozens of countries participate in dozens of different ways, depending upon the need at hand and on individual nation's capabilities. The only commonality is US leadership 6 . The closest thing to an official definition came from a senior DoD official responsible for PSI who defined it as "a multilateral framework for national action and to facilitate international cooperation" 7 . What is most certain is that PSI reflects the need for a more dynamic and active approach to the global proliferation problem…reflecting the reality that proliferators are actively and aggressively seeking WMD using techniques that thwart traditional export controls and enforcement measures. Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qurbi (receiving assurances from the Yemeni that this was the last shipment), the US declared that it lacked the necessary legal authority to seize the cargo and allowed the shipment to be delivered. US White House spokesman Ari Fleischer also suggested that Yemen's status as an ally in anti-terrorism efforts was an important factor in the decision and that Yemen did not pose a threat to the US. And while the shipment to Yemen was a worry as Sana'a had stated it would stop purchasing missiles from North Korea, the incident was far more troubling as it underscored continuing US concern about Pyongyang's continued penchant to sell missiles and related components to anyone who could afford them. 11 As Professor Graham Allison of the Kennedy School of Government has put it, North Korea has a well-earned reputation as "Missiles 'R Us." 
WMD Strategy Sets Stage

Crafting a Pro-Active Approach
Who Can Join
A unique aspect of PSI is the criteria for membership and its emphasis on activities rather than the acceptance of principles alone. According to State Department, anyone who accepts the Statement of Interdiction Principles and has the necessary legal authority to implement the Principles is encouraged to join. For any state that does not have any or all of the requisite legal authorities, it is encouraged to create the necessary legal authorities. States that have operational and informational capabilities are also encouraged to join. In the end the US "wants countries to establish the practical [emphasis added] basis to cooperate on interdiction efforts." 3 Specifically, State Department outlines the following steps for countries desiring to join PSI:
• Formally commit to and publicly endorse, if possible, the PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles and indicate willingness to take all steps available to support PSI efforts.
• Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air or on land. Indicate willingness to strengthen authorities where appropriate.
• Identify specific national assets that might contribute to PSI efforts (e.g. information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets).
• Provide points of contact for PSI interdiction requests and other operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government processes to coordinate PSI response efforts.
• Be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual operations as opportunities arise.
• Be willing to consider signing relevant agreements (e.g., boarding agreements) or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts (e.g., MOU on overflight denial) 4 Another distinctive characteristic is that no funds are provided -each nation is to pay for its own efforts. However, the US states that it wants to ensure that all participants are able to take effective action if called on and is not averse to offering assistance -training, grants, aid, etc. -in developing needed capabilities to select countries.
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Legal Authority
Much of the Proliferation Security Initiative is little more than "the consistent and rigorous application of existing rights under national and international law.
Concurrently, the initiative promotes the development of new legal authorities by way for bilateral and multilateral treaties, Finally, and less obviously, PSI may lead to new rights under customary international law." 6 When PSI first originated, the perception was that PSI was a pro-active departure from control regimes already in place. Part of the reason for this perception originated in President Bush's speech announcing the initiative in which he said PSI would give member nations the capability to search suspect vessels and aircraft and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies on board. 7 The perception was further compounded by statements of senior US government officials who indicated that PSI would create a precedent for the seizure of WMD-related materials in international waters which would eventually be accepted in international law just as the British seizure of slave ships in the 1800s set a precedent later incorporated into international law. 8 However, US officials have backed off on that approach and are now focused strictly on keeping PSI within the bounds of international law and the national laws of involved states.
With regards to legal authority,
The initiative does not empower countries to do anything that they previously couldn't. Most importantly, PSI does not grant governments any new legal authority to conduct interdictions in international waters or airspace. Such interdictions may take place, but they must be confined to what is currently permissible or properly registered. It cannot be stopped simply because it is suspected of transporting WMD or related goods. PSI is primarily intended to encourage participating countries to take greater advantage of their own existing national laws to intercept threatening trade passing through their territories and where they have jurisdiction to act. In situations where the legal authority to act may be ambiguous, PSI core group participants have discussed going to the UN Security Council for authorization. PSI participants are also working to expand their legal authority to interdict shipments by signing bilateral boarding agreements with select countries to secure expedited processes or pre-approval for stopping and searching their ships at sea. The US has concluded such agreements with Liberia and Panama, the two countries with the largest fleets of registered ocean-going vessels in the world. 9 The boarding agreements signed with Liberia, Panama and the Marshall Islands provide the US and other PSI participants with significant authority. In the case of Liberia, the agreement allows PSI nations to board a suspect vessel flying the Liberian flag and if evidence of WMD proliferation is found, to detain the vessel, as well as items and persons on board.
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Legal Limitations
While the boarding agreements signed by nations with large fleets of registered vessels provides the US with significant legal authority, there are some limitations. claiming that a suspect vessel interdiction falls within the bounds of pre-emptive selfdefense, or violating international law. 18 Of these, of course, a UNSC resolution is preferable.
And to this point, PSI remains an informal arrangement among nations. To date, there is still no list of criteria by which interdictions are to be made (except that the cargo is destined for a recipient that might use it to harm the US or other country). There is also no secretariat or formal organization that serves as a coordinating body. Instead, participants aim to readily share information among one another as appropriate and to act when necessary to help seize or thwart dangerous trade.
There is also no obligation to act by any of the PSI participants. In every case the SOP calls upon participating states to act when "good cause" is shown. In responding to a request, "each state will need to decide for itself whether the information provided by the requesting state warrants acceding to the request."
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Intelligence Sharing
Another unique aspect of PSI that differentiates it from other international regimes is its approach to intelligence sharing. The Bush administration also considers it one of the strengths of PSI. Unlike the intelligence sharing mechanism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which allows for the sharing of all intelligence by every signatory, PSI provides intelligence on a case-by-case basis. In PSI, sensitive information on specific interdiction activities is shared only among those nations involved in a possible interdiction.
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While from a multilateralist viewpoint this might be considered a weakness, it must As PSI handles intelligence on a case-by-case basis, it provides the US with a broader margin of reassurance which is related directly to the very nature of PSI operations. As the US will require the contribution of PSI member nations to successfully carry out interdictions, the US by necessity must provide specific, actionable intelligence to gain multilateral cooperation. And, by its very nature, specific, actionable intelligence has a short shelf life. For example, when a suspect vessel has completed its transit through a strait where an interdiction could take place, intelligence related to the vessel and its passage loses relevance and value.
International Score Card
On the whole, international reaction to the Proliferation Security Initiative has been positive. Since its inception, the United States states that over sixty nations have signed on. Exactly who belongs is unclear as many nations have not made their participation known, although the US encourages public disclosure. As one might expect, the core group (consisting of Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Australia is also a strong advocate, citing PSI as an example of Australia's taking on a leading role in the "world police force" and crediting PSI as helping to further develop international anti-terrorism plans. 22 Quite controversially, Australia has announced a new maritime security zone which extends 1,000 nautical miles from the Australian coastline.
According to Prime Minister John Howard, any vessel entering the zone will be required to report to Australian authorities and "provide details of cargo, destination, crew, port of call, likely arrival at port and so forth." Both New Zealand and Indonesia have expressed concern as the 1,000 nautical mile zone impinges on New Zealand and Indonesian territory. 23 Predictably, North Korea has labeled PSI nothing but a provocation since the first exercise. When the two are combined -overlapping crescents of nation-states characterized by instability and/or with a penchant for WMD and hyper-terrorists seeking the ultimate bomb -it becomes clear that traditional security frameworks require modification.
According to Mr. Heisbourg, what must happen is a merging of the traditional divide between internal and external security "since in practice and perception, the two are merging "since the non-state antagonist works from within the targeted society while also operation across borders. This new paradigm carries with it three basic and closely related international implications:
• Although the tools of military force projection will continue to be materially distinct from those of internal police action, the basic facets of counter-terrorism…will have to be considered in an integrated. Furthermore, domestic security and external defense machinery will have to be tightly coordinated since counter-terrorism involves a broad array of fields…economic, financial, diplomatic, political, judicial, police, intelligence, and defense…which often cut across the external/internal divide…;
• Cross-border terrorism can only be met through cross-border counteraction;
• Cross-border non-state violence cannot be effectively countered without the cooperation of other cross-border non-state actors, such as the banking community and the transportation sector." 6 In combating the proliferation of WMD, no approaches can be ignored. As former …there is no silver bullet of policy to stop proliferation of WMD -neither preemption, nor arms control, nor export controls, nor diplomacy, nor missile defense, nor deterrence, nor any other single tool. The point so often missed in debate over this central security problem is that we need, in one way or another, all of these approaches. The problems of WMD spread to state and non-state actors are different in different places, and the variety of the problems must be matched with a variety of approaches. The magnitude of the problem requires that we leave no option out of our consideration. We need to be strengthening each and every one of our counterproliferation tools. Some of our approaches date back decades and…are in need of fundamental overhaul. The overall US response to WMD proliferation is encapsulated in a term called layered defense. Layered defense aims to thwart terrorists as many ways as possible in their efforts to build and smuggle a WMD weapon into the US. The underlying philosophy is that the chances for success in countering WMD will be higher the more 
Air Interdiction
Now, the US hopes to move PSI itself into the development of air interdiction capabilities-a capability in which operational issues are much more challenging and intelligence will require much better definition. Legal issues may be simpler -countries may just deny the use of their airspace to an aircraft assessed to be carrying WMDrelated cargo. However, air interdiction is time-compressed considerably. Instead of a window of days or even weeks in which one might stop a vessel on the high seas, the time to act is shortened to hours in the case of an aircraft. Consequently, a much higher premium will be placed on advance, detailed intelligence that can identify when and from where an air shipment is to take place and to where it is likely headed. Only in this case could PSI participants ensure their respective military, law enforcement, and air traffic control establishments are aware, and be reasonably sure that needed air assets are in place to track the suspect flight, to possibly intercept it, and divert the aircraft if required.
An Air Interdiction Scenario
The complexities of an air interdiction may be better understood through the 
From Hypothetical to Practical
When PSI started, one of its first operational tasks was to understand the complete range of authorities, both international and domestic, available to participating nations in the interdiction of WMD materials. This was accomplished by regular meetings of operational law experts from participating nations who sifted through their respective national laws and statutes to find legal authorities that might be useful to PSI. To date, the focus has been on maritime law as it was thought to be the easiest to do. As PSI enters its third year of existence, DoD is now turning to accomplishing the same task for air interdiction.
The legal issues for air interdiction and maritime interdiction have similarities and differences. They are similar in that airspace is divided into national and international airspace just as there are territorial waters and international waters under the Law of the Sea Conventions. With regards to airspace, national airspace includes that above the territorial sea. What is most strikingly different is that there is no right of innocent passage for overflight of a territorial sea. However, aircraft are allowed passage over straits and archipelagic waters even though the airspace is considered national. 1 On the other hand, international law still calls for the due regard to the safety of civil aircraft and measures involving the use of force to deny airspace or force a landing for inspection could result in protests from the affected country. forces may be required to maintain forward presence, conduct joint and multinational exercises, carry out information operations, and train US forces and those of allies to fulfill WMD-related missions.
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As mentioned above and addressed specifically in JP 3-40, PSI can also serve as a vehicle for fully realizing the potential of security cooperation programs with PSI member nations. Areas of focus described include multinational exercises, security assistance, multinational training, education & experimentation, and defense and military contacts). 6 To further underscore the importance of expanding PSI into the air and ground domains, JP 3-40 states that "most notably, the PSI adds air and ground interdiction options to the long-standing maritime interdiction capability. The scope of PSI will all but mandate that conventional forces participate in interdiction operations alongside national assets." The United States will seize the strategic initiative in all areas of defense activity-assuring, dissuading, deterring, and defeating. Our first priority is the defeat of direct threats to the United States. Terrorists have demonstrated that they can conduct devastating surprise attacks. Allowing opponents to strike first-particularly in an era of proliferation-is unacceptable. Therefore the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to mature. 8 In building an active, layered defense, the concept of prevention is considered a critical component. Possible preventive activities include "security cooperation, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and non-proliferation initiativesincluding international cooperation to interdict illicit WMD transiting the commons." 9 Preventive actions may also go much further to include prevention of an outbreak of hostilities or to defend or restore a friendly government. And "under the most dangerous and compelling circumstances, prevention might require the use of force to disable or destroy WMD in the possession of terrorists or others or to strike targets (e.g. terrorists)
that directly threaten the United States or others or US friends or other interests. further compounded and intensified the proliferation problem. 11 As a result, the President made seven proposals to counter the threat of WMD.
First was an expansion of PSI to go beyond interdictions and transfers and include direct action against proliferation networks. As President Bush said in his speech, "We need greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers". 
A New Paradigm?
One last area concerning PSI merits attention, and that is the 'transformational' label given by Secretary of State Rice. Her description of PSI as an outstanding example of transformational diplomacy that crosses disciplines, regional lines and expertise to solve problems -an organization without an address or a building, points out the 'structural' traits which make PSI unique. Another unstated but no less unique characteristic is the speed in which PSI took form and the multiplication of members in its two years of existence.
In both structural and time dimensions, it appears the Proliferation Security Initiative is not so much transformational but is instead a unique product of a very unique set of 
Conclusion
At its most basic level, the Proliferation Security Initiative is intended to make it more costly and risky for proliferators to acquire the weapons or materials they seek. By doing so, PSI members hope that other countries will be dissuaded from pursuing weapons in the first place or experience significant delays in their acquisition efforts
The Proliferation Security Initiative is but one instrument to prevent proliferation.
When coupled with nonproliferation treaties, multilateral export control regimes, national export controls and enforcement measures, PSI goes a long way towards closing the door on proliferators. Its greatest strength may be its practical approach to the issue -building momentum by gathering a community of nations, building a network of national experts across disciplines, and using national and international law and regulations already on the books. While less than ideal, PSI represents a practical, appropriate response to a difficult problem. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."
Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials. 2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts. 3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments. 4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include: a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so. b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states. d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights. f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. 
